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Dr. Richard De Smet 
and Sankara's Advaita 
T.S. Rukmani 
Concordia University 
I HAVE had the privilege of meeting Dr. 
Richard De Smet in Shimla at the Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study, when we both 
participated in a Seminar organized by the 
Institute in 1989. We had opportunities of 
discussing Sankara's Brahman and the 
Christian concept of God at that time 
without being able to fully understand each 
other's position. That has been at the back of 
my mind all these years, and I was happy 
when Bradley Malkovsky asked me to write 
on Dr. De Smet's view of Sankara's 
Brahman for the Bulletin. I thus got an 
opportunity to revisit that topic ·again and 
have done so in what follows. Needless to 
say that, because of the limitation of space, I 
have not been able to do full justice to the 
topic. 
Before I venture to write something on 
Dr. De Smet's approach to the ontological 
understanding of the Brahman-concept in 
Sankara's Advaita Vedanta (hereafter 
Advaita), I would ·like . to state what I 
understand by comparative work. In order to 
do a comparative study of two different 
religions o.r theologies, either in a religious 
or theological sense, it is not necessary to 
somehow fit the ontology·and epistemology 
of the two systems being studied to appear 
as if they mean the same thing. In such an 
approach there is injustice done to both the 
systems and one ends up trying to, 
sometimes, fit round circles into square 
pegs. It is wise to acknowledge that religious. 
and theological schools that rise and grow in 
different cultural milieus can have a 
rationale of their own and the best we can 
do, as scholars, is to understand and 
appreciate the dynamics of that growth in 
their own setting. There is a historical 
dimension to every growth, and we sit on 
the shoulders of our predecessors such that a 
comparative study can only "pretend" to be 
an independent, objective approach. A 
corollary to that is the question as to whether 
the judgment - of another 
philosophy/theology/religion will be 
acceptable to the other, when the approach is 
generally based on the values, concepts, 
even the vocabulary and language of the one 
who studies the other, which the other need 
not or does not recognize. 
In Dr. De Smet's case we know that he 
was working through the languages in which 
the original material of the two schools he 
studied was available as for instance, 
Sanskrit for Sankara's Advaita and English 
or any other language for the other 
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Assuming his competence in these 
languages, he still had to transcend the arena 
of translations and somehow be able to 
creatively intuit the meanings of the foreign 
concepts that he intended to compare and 
which come with a lot of previous cultural 
and intellectual baggage. 
. So there are a number of obstacles to 
overcome if indeed we cando an honest, 
comparative work between two schools of 
thought, from two very different cultures. 
Because of the above limitations it is easy to 
concur with B.K.Matilal's understanding of 
comparative work (though he was speaking 
with reference to comparative philosophy) 
as "the task of explaining and translating 
classical Indian philosophical texts in a 
western language". 1 Since S ankara , s 
Advaita is closer to philosophy than to 
theology or religion this is relevant for our 
purpose and would come closest to what I 
would count as doing a comparative study. 
When we take up the question of De 
Smet's comparative study of Christianity 
and Advaita, all the above thoughts crowd 
one's mind. As a Christian theologian, it 
became important for De Smet to somehow 
find parallels between Advaita, the 
paramount philosophical/theologiCal school 
in the mind of the Hindus in general, and 
Christianity, for, in common. with other 
theologians, a deeper theological exchange 
between followers of these two spiritual 
paths was possible only when 
misconceptions could be cleared away. 2 
De Smet's primary loyalty to Christian 
theology and his love for Sankara's Advaita 
expressed movingly as "From Sankara I 
learned to focus on the non-dualistic creative 
presence in me - and in all creatures - of the 
absolute Brahman as my constant Ground 
and Cause and thus Supreme Saksin and 
Atman", goaded him to find parallels 
between these two systems3, one of which is 
out and out a theology with belief in a 
personal God, who created everything out of 
nothing, and the other not a theology in the 
strict sense of the term, maybe not a 
philosophy as well in the accepted sense of 
Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita 13 
the term in the west, but perhaps a 
hermeneutic unraveling of the acosmic 
(nisprapanca) meanings hidden ill the 
Upanisads. 
While in Christianity God is the 
Supreme; ontological Absolute, Sankara's 
Advaita "has no room for gods or deity, 
excepting as a provisional posit. It has no 
room for God except in the context of a 
(metaphysically) ignorant person's inquiry 
about the cause of the universe which 
unknown to him is only an unreal 
appearance (and so is not in need of a 
creator).,,4 Thus we are conscious of the 
diametrically opposite ways of thinking of 
the Ultimate, Ontological Entity, as well as 
the different views of 
CreationlManifestation, that such divergent 
views entail. 
In this paper, I try and focus on three 
published papers of De Smet, entitled 
"Advaitavada and Christianity" (1973) 
(hereafter "Advaitavada,,)5, "Origin: 
Creation and Emanation" (1978) (hereafter 
"Origin"),6 and "Forward Steps in Sankara 
Research" (1987) (hereafter "Forward 
Steps"),7 where he engages in a comparison 
of some concepts in Advaita and 
Christianity, with a view to arriving at a 
convergence. I would have liked to have 
more of his publications for this study, but, 
unfortunately, these were the only ones 
which were readily available. So if there are 
other views and revisions presented in any 
later papers, I plead guilty for not consulting 
them, for in spite of my best efforts, I did 
not succeed in procuring them. But I have 
had access to the excellent paper on "The 
Personhood of S ankara , s Para Brahman" 
(1997) by Malkovskl as well as the volume 
of papers published (2000), in 
commemoration of the passing away of Dr. 
De Smet in 1997 edited by Malkovsky.9 
Froin these sources I can surmise that De 
Smet did not change or modify his basic 
stand from his early publications regarding 
his understanding of the concepts in 
Advaita, based on which he made the 
comparative studies. 
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If my reading of De Smet is right, then 
the main concern he had was with the 
Nirguna nature of Brahman as pure 
Consciousness that could not permit the 
attribution of a creative function to It. Since 
only a person having 'personhood' can have 
a relation of creativity to the world, 
Christian theologians in general, and De 
Smet in particular, who is our focus, try to 
find attribution of personhood to the 
Nirguna Brahman. De Smet services a 
number of devices and uses some selective 
readings from Sankara's works to arrive at 
the conclusion that it is possible to posit 
personhood to Brahman and thus link it with 
the manifested world. My task is to see how 
far De Smet has succeeded or not in this 
enterprise. 
As a preamble to this exercise we need 
to be clear about some points. Firstly there is 
in place a strong hermeneutic tradition set 
by the Purvamimamsa school, which is 
followed by Sankara as well, in his approach 
to the interpretation of the Prasthanatrayi 
(Brahmasutra, Upanisads and 
Bhagavadgita). These principles, though 
well known, can suffer repetition as I will 
take recourse to them in my explaining 
Sankara, whenever it is relevant. These are 
the six hermeneutic principles collectively 
known as the sadlinga. The first is 
upakramopasarnharaikya which is important, 
for it denotes an uniformity of meaning 
between the start and finish of a sentence, a 
section, <;l chapter etc. The second principle 
is abhyasa or the repetition of the theme 
being discussed in the work; the third is 
apurva or a new conclusion. sought to be 
brought about; the fourth is phala or the 
fruitfulness of such a conclusion; the fifth is 
arthavada or agreeing or criticizing it in the 
\york; and the sixth is upapatti or the method 
Of argumentation. Sankara also uses the 
reasonings known as upakrama-parakrama 
where the initial statements carry more 
weight then the later ones, as also 
apaccheda-nyaya, which allows the negation 
of the previous statement in case the 
subsequent one contradicts itlO. Sankara 
uses these hermeneutic devices to interpret 
the Prasthanatrayi in accordance with his 
Advaita stance. 
Given this importance to the exegetical 
tradition of interpretation we cannot afford 
to ignore Sankara's methodological 
approach to the understanding of each of the 
sections (adhikarana) in Badarayana's 
Brahmasutras (BS). His commentaries on 
the BS as well as the Upanisads (UP) and 
the Gita are very often preceded by a 
preamble to the concerned section, where he 
states his thesis and prepares the reader for 
what follows in the subsequent sections of 
the particular chapter. He upholds the 
principle of ekavakyata or the first 
exegetical principle of consistency of the 
main thesis throughout the entire work and 
frequently refers to it in the body of the 
work and in separate sections. It is always 
useful to come back to these initial 
introductory portions in Sankara, in order to 
make sense of some very difficult points that 
are raised in the course of the commentaries. 
To come back to the paper 
"Advaitavada" mentioned above, De Smet 
tries to set ilp an analogy between the 
Advaita Nirguna Brahman and the God of 
Christianity, using mainly the passage 4.3.7. 
from the Brhadaranyaka Up. (Br. Up.) for 
the understanding of Brahman. De Smet 
tries to establish an analogical reading of the 
God of Christianity including that of Trinity 
and Sankara's Advaita concept of Brahman. 
This is one of the pet obsessions of De Smet, 
for he again comes back to it in his paper 
"Origin." In the "Origin" paper he uses 
Aquinas' description of God as 'eminently 
Esse (Be)' and the Taittiriya Up. statement 
of Brahman being 'sat yam, jnanam, 
anantam' (Truth, Consciousness, Infinite).ll 
He talks about this again in his "Forward 
Steps" where he tries to argue for the 
identical ontological status of the Christian 
God and Advaita Brahman, using a three 
level language for approaching both these 
transcendent realities. Thus in "Forward 
Steps" he believes that Sankara, when he 
uses the three levels of adhyasa 
3
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(superimposition), apavada (negation) and 
paramartha-laksana (indication by the 
supreme sense), is actually talking about a 
three level language which can then be taken 
to indicate for both Christian God and 
Brahman their transcendent nature beyond 
the primary meanings of ordinary language 
(vyavahara), Upanishadic language which is 
metaphysical and metempirical language 
which absolutizes words. 12 This almost 
sounds like the sphota theory of the 
grammarians who absolutize Word as 
sabdabrahman. But this not the case in 
Sankara, and his opposition to the sphota 
concept is well known. De Smet might find 
the three levels of adhyasa, apavada and 
paramarthata a satisfactory tool to explain 
the Christian God, but in Sankara that is not 
the use to which adhyasa and apavada are 
put to. 
Let us now look at Br. Up. 4.3.7 which 
Smet uses in "Advaitavada" for this 
comparison. Sankara in fact has only two 
categories to which he applies the 
methodology of adhyasa and apavada, i.e. 
Brahman (Atman/Self) and the not-Self. In 
Br. Up. 4.3.713. Sankara uses the two 
devices mail~ly for an epistemic purpose and 
to extend the scope of adhyasa to explain 
how the Self functions at a lower level of 
reality. The main point here is the identity of 
Brahman with the intellect, the symbol of 
consciousness. Sankara is concerned with 
the way tne reflection of consciousness 
functions and illumines the aggregate of 
body and organs. He has already declared in 
many places the distinction between the 
relational and non-relational view of 
Realityl4, after stating it as his main thesis in 
the Introduction to BS 1.1.1 (thus recalling 
to mind the second hermeneutic principle of 
abhyasa). He has discussed his methodology 
of adhyasa and apavada in BSBh 2.3.6 as 
well as in the Gitabhasya 13.14 and 
consistently maintains his main thesis in his 
commentaries on the Prasthanatrayi. He 
adds one more level when talking about 
error in the world and dream experiences. IS 
To interpret the three or two levels of 
Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita 15 
Reality as if they refer to just linguistic 
categories is not fair to Sankara's Advaita. 
Adhyasa is an overriding concept in 
Sankara's Advaita and it cannot be used 
selectively to explain some things while 
leaving out other things in the system. 
We also find Sankara talking about two 
kinds of knowledge, and that can only make 
sense when the levels they deal with are two 
levels of reality 16. Br. Up. Adhyayas 
(chapters) three and four are together called 
the Yajnavalkyakanda, and they have to be 
read together as. one unit, along with 
Sankara's commentaries, to understand how 
Sankara presents his two-level reality. Thus 
in his commentary on Br. Up. 3.4.2 he 
clearly states his two-level reality which in 
tum only reiterates what has already been 
said in 2.4.12, 1.5.3, and in other places. 
That Brahman and Atman are One and is the 
Higher Reality, while the world and the 
selves in it belong to a lower reality, is the 
contention of Sankara. De Smet mentions in 
"Advaitavada" based on BSBh II.1.9 and 
TU. 11.6.1 that "we cannot go on repeating 
without ado that Sankara professes the 
identity of the individual soul with the 
Absolute,,17. While De Smet uses TU II.6.1 
which translates as "From that Brahman or 
from this Atman was produced Akasa" to 
arrive at his conclusion, it is a position 
difficult to maintain especially when 
Sankara says in his bhasya on the same TU 
2.1.1 "From That (Brahman) or from this 
Atman came into existence Akasah" 
(emphasis mine), i.e. since the word Self 
(atman) is used with xegard to Brahman 
Itself, it follows that Brahman is the Self of 
the cogmzmg individual. Sankara's 
commentary on TU 2.1.1 which De Smet 
refers to, only confirms Sankara's 
conviction about the identity of the Self 
(atman) with Brahman and not otherwise. 
Repeatedly in that commentary, Sankara 
speaks of this identity. It is a long 
commentary, and I give below two of his 
statements there to that effect. Thus he says 
(1) " though' the individual Self is 
intrinsically identical to Brahman ... 18; 
4
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(2) "thus even though Brahman is one's Self 
it can remain unattained through 
ignorance19; from these two combined with 
the statement that "From That Brahman or 
from this Atman came into existence Akasah 
" it becomes clear that Brahman is identical 
with the individual Self.20 So, in Advaita, 
there is no distinction between Atman and 
Brahman and, therefore, it is not possible to 
acquiesce with Smet in this regard. 
The rest of "Advaitavada" dwells upon 
the making of man in Christianity and goes 
on to talk about the" attainment of the 
"beatific vision" through the grace of God 
and how the individual "ceases to conceive 
itself as a being separate from God. 
This ... demands no annihilation of its. 
dependent existence ... ,,21. De Smet tries hard 
to restate Sankara's position as follows: 
"The too little known anthropology which 
Sankara develops around the notion of the 
human ego as a reflection of the inner 
Witness opens up towards a conception of 
man as a totally dependent and contingent 
being which is yet strongly integrated" 22. 
We can with confidence state that there is a 
world of difference not only in the way 
humans/Selves are perceived in Advaita, but 
also in the nature of liberation, in the means 
to liberation and in the identity repeatedly 
proclaimed by Sankara's Advaita between 
Brahman and Selves. All these are points of 
dispute and taken together leave us sceptical 
about the comparison between the two 
Ultimates and related issues. 
In "Origin" De Smet also discusses the 
notion of Creation, keeping the three 
linguistic, levels in the background. While 
the Christian God creates ex nihilo, in 
Sankara's Advaita the universe/ exists in 
Brahman before its manifestation.23 
Christianity starts with God and then 
explains the universe as created by God. 
Sankara's philosophical inquiry starts with 
the world in order to somehow explain it. He 
therefore resorts to adhyasa to retain the 
Absolute, Nirgnuna, intrinsic nature of 
Brahman. In his introduction to this 
adhil<:arana (topic), Sankara states that this 
way of mentioning the ongm etc. of the 
universe is only a hermeneutic effort to 
clarify TU 3.1; in other words there is no 
direct involvement of Brahman with the 
world. Thus it is not possible to agree with 
De Smet when he says " ... the mind is ready 
to climb to the level of eminence (the 
Dionysian Hyperoche or Sankarian 
paramarthapatti) and to say, for instance, 
with Aquinas : Creation is the emanation of 
the whole universe by and from the 
universal Cause ... ,,24. De Smet also wants to 
eliminate the weak sense of "production" as 
"mete manifestation" [of the universe]. This 
is too tall an order. Manifestation is not 
Sankara's formulation at all. This 
understanding is part of the Vedic tradition 
and is a basic tenet of practically all schools 
of religious thought in Hinduism. Therefore 
Sankara believes in a cyclical origin, 
sustenance and dissolution of the universe 
and also that successive 
creations/manifestations take place as a 
result of virtue and vice and come into 
existence like the earlier ones.25 Sankara 
discusses this elaborately in BSBh 2.1.10; 
therefore it cannot be wished away and 
certainly not in Sankara's Advaita. 
At another level De Smet, in the same 
paper, uses the "satkaryavada" (the pre-
existence of the effect in the cause) to 
valorize St Thomas' statement of "a 
creature as pre-existing in God is the divine 
Essence itself ,26. There is a considerable. 
mixing up of categories in this statement. 
Sankara nowhere states that Brahman is the 
locus of the Atman, which, l:?y the way, is 
also not a creature as understood by 
Aquinas, but always and consistently 
Sankara maintains Atman's identity with 
Brahman. I have also a problem when De 
Smet argues for understanding time at two 
levels (1) Universal time as an abstraction 
and (2) "concrete time [which] is co-created 
with the universe since, being a property of 
its being, it does not precede it but rather 
follows from its essential mobility and 
.evolving changeability'. Whether it starts 
from a' first instant or is beginning1ess 
5
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depends entirely on the Creator's free 
decision and cannot be settled by any 
deductive pr6cess',27. There is again a 
category mistake in this argument. All this 
can make sense only in the context of 
"Creation talk" and the "notion of the first 
instant of the universe". De Smet also says 
that ontological origination does not itself 
imply temporal beginning even if the reverse 
is true. It is obvious, as already mentioned, 
that all this can only make sense in a 
Christian context, where there is a positive 
temporal origination of the universe. For 
Sankara the whole discussion of the origin 
of time or the universe, whether ontological 
or temporal is irrelevant, as it is within the 
domain of avidya. 
De Smet comes back to the Creator 
notion of Christianity in a discussion of the 
nature of the effects of creation. In his paper 
"Origin" he ties the creatures to the idea of 
upadhis in Advaita, and one need not quarrel 
with that. But it is difficult to agree with his 
conclusion of the "creatures' total 
dependence on their Creator" in the context 
of Advaita. De Smet brings in the concept 
of grace in Advaita (I will touch upon that 
briefly later),·· combining it with the 
unsubstantiated theory. of creation in 
Advaita. When De Smet quotes BS II.l.25 
and translates it as the "Supreme 
Atman ... creates ... ", it is important to recall 
Sankara's introduction of Isvara in the act of 
creation, preservation and destruction in BS 
1.1.2. Thus, he says "It is not possible to 
imagine any other than this kind of qualified 
Isvara Ifor the creation of this kind of 
qualified universe"z8. He clearly establishes 
that, according to him it is )svara, and not 
Brahman, that is associated with janma 
(origin), sthiti (maintenance) and laya 
(destruction) of the universe. As for 11.1.25 
which is used by De Smet to undergird his 
creation hypothesis, Sankara has already 
stated as a preamble to this topic before 11.1 
that "the omniscient omnipotent Sarvesvara 
is the cause of the universe ... " and using the 
principles of both upakramopasamharaikya 
(unity of meaning in the section), abhyasa 
Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita 17 
(repetition of what has already been 
introduced) and upakrama-parakrama 
(where . 'initial statements in general carry 
more weight than subsequent ones) we have 
to understand that here also it is Isvara that 
is indicated. The debate is furthered in 
11.1.27 by stating that Brahman remains 
unchanged and beyond phenomenal actions, 
and all this is imagined through ignorancez9. 
Many statements from the BS and the 
Upanisads that De Smet uses to compare 
Christianity and the Advaita of Sankara are 
difficult to reconcile precisely because of 
Sankara's own devices of avidya (adhyasa), 
nirguna/saguna Brahman, maya etc. There 
are statements both in the BS and the UP 
which can be profitably compared to 
Christianity, but those would be closer to 
Visistadvaita or Dvaita and not Advaita. 
Thus, we have to disagree with De Smet 
when he states that "we can now with St. 
Thomas define creation adequately and 
eminently (paramarthatah) as the intelligent 
and freely willed emanation of the whole 
reality or positivity of the universe from the 
pure Esse" 30. 
In the same paper "Origin" there is 
mention of tadatmya, and De Smet's 
understanding of it, based on BS II.1.14, is 
as follows. " ... the non-difference implied by 
tadatmya does not eliminate distinction but 
stresses the ontological character. of the 
creature's dependence as well as the 
Creator's transcendence." 31 BS II. 1. 14 has 
been explained at length by Sankara. The 
sutra in translation reads, 'There is 
ananyatva (non-difference) of those (cause 
and effect) because of the texts on origin 
etc ... " The examples that Sankara brings in 
here are spaces within pots and jars being 
non-different from all-pervading akasah, and 
water in a mirage being non-different from a 
sandy desert. In his commentary Sankara 
stresses the "elimination of distinction" 
between the Self and Brahman. Sankara 
again brings in Isvara in this context, who 
alone can be associated with creation etc., 
and reiterates the 'identity or non-difference 
of the Selves with Brahman. 
6
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Continuing the discussion on tadatmya, 
De Smet uses TU 11.6.1 and Sankara's 
commentary on it to substantiate his claim. 
He translates one line of this really long 
commentary as "names and forms in all their 
states have Brahman alone as their Atman, 
but Brahman has not its Atman in them (i.e., 
tadatmya is not mutual).,,32 There is a 
misunderstanding of the word tadatmakam 
here by De Smet. I translate below the text 
in question: 33 
Thus it is because of Brahman 
alone that nama and rupa have their 
being in all conditions; but Brahman 
is not of their nature [but Brahman 
does not consist of them, according 
to Gambhirananda]; they are said to 
have their being in Brahman in 
essence, because they are "no more" 
[cease to exist, according to 
Gambhirananda] when Brahman is 
eliminated. By these two limiting 
conditions, Brahman is the agent of 
all empirical experiences such as 
knower, knowable and knowledge 
etc., and all that it entails. 
Now the word tadatmakam is a 
compound (samasa) and an adjective 
qualifying Brahman, and the part tat stands 
for namarupa and not for Brahman. 
Atmakam means "made up or composed of, 
of the nature or character of" etc. Therefore 
na tadatmakam cannot be translated as 
"Brahman does not have its Atman in them" 
as De Smet does. It is like the word 
rasatmakam in vakyam rasatmakam kavyam 
(A sentence that has the character of rasa is 
literature).34 Tadatmakam indicates that 
Brahman is not of the nature of namarupa 
and not that Brahman has not Atman in 
them. Sankara also makes reference to the 
topic under discussion by drawing our 
attention to the introduction to this whole 
section in the TU and indicating that the 
topic under discussion is that the Self is 
imagined to enter the very cavity (of the 
heart). He thus makes use. of the 
hermeneutic principle of ekavakyata and 
also reiterates (abhyasa) that the topic l;>eing 
examined is the knowledge of Brahma,n.. 35 
I have spent some time explaining this at 
length because it is also quoted by 
Malkovsky in his paper titled "The 
Personhood of Samkara's Para Brahman".36 
As this paper is concerned mainly with De 
Smet's arguments I will not engage 
Malkovsky's points raised in his paper. 
So the tadatmya or the unique. identity 
between Brahman and Atrnan is what 
Sankara repeatedly emphasizes. He uses the 
example of the mistaken identity between 
the rope/snake or shell/silver in order to 
illustrate this unique relation. The relation 
between the rope and snake is neither 
difference, as we cannot relate two different 
terms as snake and rope as "This is snake", 
nor non-difference since the rope is 
empirically real while the snake is only 
apparently so; therefore there can be no 
relation of identity between "two levels of 
being". It is, therefore, a unique relation 
known as tadatmya. If, in the above, the 
rope IS denied the snake "Is not"; but if the 
snake is denied (due to realizing one's 
mistake) the rope "Is". Thus, if we apply the 
same understanding to TU II.6.1, Brahman 
is the same as the rope, and therefore It 
underlies everything; but Brahman as 
namarupa does not underlie them, i.e. isnot 
of their nature, since once namarupa is 
transcended through knowledge it vanishes 
and Brahman alone "Is". This is another 
example of adhyasa and also made clear in 
Br. Up. IV.3.7 and Sankar~'s commentary 
on it with which De Smet starts the 
argument in "Advaitavada" and mentioned 
earlier.37 
Since the question of grace occurs in all 
the three papers under consideration I will 
briefly touch upon it here. De Smet uses BS 
2.3.41 and Sankara's commentary thereon 
for support of Sankara's acceptance of 
divine grace, both in "Origin" and "Forward 
Steps,,38 . One has only to read the entire 
commentary on 2.3.41 to know that Sankara 
does not support what De Smet believes he 
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does. The commentaries on 2.3.41 and 
2.3.42 have to be read together to make 
sense. Firstly, it is Isvara, and not Brahman, 
whose anugraha (grace) is under discussion. 
Secondly, Sankara continues the same topic 
in the next sutra and says "(Isvara) is 
however dependent on the jiva's efforts, so 
that injunctions and prohibitions are not 
meaningless and other defects do not 
arise,,39 . In his commentary Sankara clearly 
states that Isvara makes the jiva act now in 
accordance with its past karma, and He 
directed him earlier in accordance with what 
he did earlier, and so on. So, since samsara 
is without beginning, this is without fault. 
We can thus see that it is difficult to read 
divine grace in Advaita. Grace has to be 
showered o"n one without any pre-attached 
conditions, and that is not the case in 
Sankara's Advaita.40 
This brief examination of the above 
papers of Dr.De Smet has shown that he has 
not been able to make a case for either the 
personhood of Sankara's Advaita Brahman, 
nor for the origin of the seen universe, both 
of which differs radically from the Christian 
God and from creation ex nihilo. De Smet 
tried hard to find parallels between 
Christianity and Sankara's Advaita, but he 
was dealing with two entirely different 
systems of thought. Just as in the 
understanding of Christianity one has to 
look at all the aspects of its theology, so 
also, in order to correctly comprehend 
Advaita, i( is necessary to read Sankara's 
commentaries as a whole in order to arrive 
at an understanding of Advaita in all its 
dimensions. Selective use of a line here or 
there cannot help in the long run. This, in 
no way belittles the sincere efforts of Dr. De 
Smet who genuinely sought parallels in the 
two systems. While new interpretations are 
always welcome they have to be in 
conformity with the understanding of the 
scholar they seek to interpret. Gadamer's 
insightful observations regarding what 
hermeneutics entails is true of all such 
exercises:41 
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Historical [philosophical] 
understanding, .. .is the action of 
subjectivity purged of all prejudices, 
and it is achieved in direct 
proportion to the knower's ability to 
set aside his own horizons by means 
of an effective historical method ... .Is 
it the case ... that the knower can 
leave his immediate situation in the 
present merely by adopting an 
attitude? 
Shaped by the past in an infinity of 
unexamined ways, the present 
situation is the "given" in which 
understanding is rooted, and which 
reflection can never entirely hold at 
a critical distance and objectify. 
Only a neutralized, prejudice-free 
consciousness guarantees the 
objectivity of knowledge. 
Dr.De Smet was a Christian theologian 
and though sincere in his approach to 
Sankara and in his efforts to understand 
Sankara's Advaita Vedanta, could not rid 
himself of his "prejudices". His efforts, 
therefore, to reinterpret Brahman, tadatmya, 
adhyasa, and other Sankarian terms and 
concepts, in order to bring Sankara's 
Advaita closer to Christian theology, have 
not yielded the desired result, in my view. 
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